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If Separation of Church and State
Doesn’t Demand Separating Religion
from Politics, Does Christian Doctrine
Require It?
Samuel W. Calhoun ∗
Abstract
This Essay responds to comments by Wayne Barnes, Ian
Huyett, and David Smolin on my prior Article, Separation of
Church and State: Jefferson, Lincoln, and the Reverend Martin
Luther King, Jr., Show It Was Never Intended to Separate
Religion From Politics. Part II, although noting a few
disagreements with Huyett and Smolin, principally argues that
they strengthen the case for the appropriateness of religious
arguments in the public square. Part III evaluates Wayne Barnes’s
contention that Christian doctrine requires separating religion
from politics.
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I. Introduction
In the opening piece of this roundtable, I argue that Jefferson,
Lincoln, and the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., demonstrate
that the concept of separating church and state was never intended
to separate religion from politics. 1 I’m very appreciative of the
three learned scholars who’ve responded to my argument. I view
Professor David Smolin’s and Ian Huyett’s contributions as
basically agreeing with, in fact strengthening, my position.
Professor Wayne Barnes, on the other hand, while agreeing that
the Constitution doesn’t prohibit political activity by Christians,
argues that Christianity itself creates constraints on believers’
actions in the public square.
In Part II, I comment on Smolin’s and Huyett’s responses. Part
III focuses principally on Barnes’s argument that Christian
doctrine, properly understood, restricts political activity by
believers. This Part was particularly interesting to write because I

1. Samuel W. Calhoun, Separation of Church and State: Jefferson, Lincoln,
and the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Show It Was Never Intended To
Separate Religion From Politics, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 459 (2018).
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once held a view similar to the one Barnes now holds. 2 I thus was
faced with refuting arguments that at one time I found convincing.
II. Smolin and Huyett Strengthen the Case for the
Appropriateness of Religious Arguments in the Public Square
Professor Smolin has long ably defended “the rights to full and
equal political participation by evangelical Christians,
traditionalist Roman Catholics, and any others who would be
restricted” 3 by proffered exclusionary criteria such as “public
accessibility, public reason, or secular rationale.” 4 Ian Huyett’s
piece is his debut in this longstanding debate. 5 He explains his
“general agreement” with my position, 6 persuasively arguing that
the Christian worldview, meriting “intellectual regard,” can’t
justifiably be barred from “speaking . . . to public policy.” 7
My argument for the permissibility of religious perspectives in
public discourse has three components: (1) the Founders didn’t
intend to separate religion from politics; 8 (2) religion and politics
2. Samuel W. Calhoun, Conviction Without Imposition: A Response to
Professor Greenawalt, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 289 (1992). My former position actually
placed more restrictions on Christians’ political activity than does Barnes’s
approach. See infra notes 127–129 and accompanying text.
3. See David M. Smolin, America’s Creed: The Inevitable, Sometimes
Dangerous, Mixing of Religion and Politics, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 512,
513 & n.4 (2018).
4. Id. at 513. Smolin, an evangelical Christian when he began advocating
for inclusion, is now a Roman Catholic. Id. at 513 n.3. He is “not yet prepared to
take up the mantle of representing Catholic perspectives on politics,” id., but he
still refutes the view that “an overarching, purportedly secular theory of politics
should be exclusionary toward religion.” Id. at 514 n.5.
5. Ian Huyett, Church History, Liberty, and Political Morality: A Response
to Professor Calhoun, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 546 (2018). I know Huyett
is a Christian, see id. at 546, from our personal interaction at Washington and
Lee. He wrote an independent research paper for me during his final year of law
school, which in part led to Ian Huyett, “As I Had Mercy on You”: Karla Faye
Tucker, Immanuel Kant, and the Impossibility of Christian Retributivism, 1
RELIGIO ET LEX 15 (Summer 2018).
6. Huyett, supra note 5, at 546.
7. Id. at 564. “[M]y [own] defense of the appropriateness of religious values
in public life isn’t limited to one religion.” Calhoun, supra note 1, at 462. Huyett,
however, narrows his focus to Christianity. Huyett, supra note 5, at 546.
8. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 465–70.

568

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 565 (2019)

have been continuously intermixed since the Founding; 9 and (3) no
other reasons justify barring religious arguments from the public
square. 10 Neither Smolin nor Huyett addresses my first argument.
They do, however, both agree that religion and politics have always
been intermixed in American life. 11 Using the example of
“contemporary presidential politics,” Smolin asserts that “religious
influence is ubiquitous” on both the political left and right 12—
indeed, “finding examples of religious motivation and rhetoric in
politics is a bit like finding samples of salt water in the Pacific
Ocean.” 13 This “widespread” practice leads Smolin rightly to
question the persistence of “academic discourse on the legitimacy
of religious rhetoric and reasoning in politics.” 14 “What needs
explanation and correction . . . is not religion in politics, but
academic theories that claim to speak for democratic liberalism
and yet are illiberal in their exclusions of religious motivation and
reasoning.” 15 Smolin and Huyett together offer cogent criticism of
the exclusionist position. From their numerous arguments, I’ll
briefly focus on five: (1) exclusionists seek a clear path for
advancing their own policy objectives; (2) exclusionists ask the
impossible of religious believers; (3) exclusionists ignore their own
“faiths”; (4) exclusionists ignore the societal threat their position
poses; and (5) fears of theocracy are a red herring.

9. Id. at 471–80.
10. Id. at 480–86.
11. Huyett, supra note 5, at 546–47; Smolin, supra note 3, at 516.
12. Smolin, supra note 3, at 517.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 518. Smolin observes that educational institutions’ commitment to
a diverse community generally doesn’t “include political, ideological or religious
diversity, even though such forms of viewpoint diversity would seem particularly
relevant in an educational context.” Id. at 524. “[C]reating a self-reinforcing
academic discourse of exclusion [thus] brings . . . [the academy’s] own mission
into question.” Id. at 545.
15. Id; see also Calhoun, supra note 1, at 485–86 (arguing that squelching
religious arguments belies a purported commitment to diversity).
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A. The Weaknesses of Exclusionism
1. Exclusionists Seek a Clear Path for Advancing Their Own
Policy Objectives
Huyett asserts that secularists’ own moral premises inform
their politics. 16 If those premises clash with some held by religious
citizens, what course should our society pursue? In a democracy,
one might suppose the answer is public debate. After open
discussion, find out which view prevails. But what if you fear losing
the debate? Smolin believes this is precisely the posture of
academic exclusionists, who fear the political success of religious
conservatives “on certain culturally sensitive issues.” 17 How then
to improve one’s chance of winning? What better strategy than
gagging your opponents by declaring them illegitimate
participants in a policy debate? 18
For those who might discount Huyett’s, Smolin’s, and my
labeling exclusionism as unfair advocacy—the thought being that
we’re just three Christians grasping at straws to avoid a personally
disagreeable outcome—it’s instructive to consider Professor Noah
Feldman’s views. Feldman, not a Christian, 19 observes that
secularists, “[b]ecause their own bedrock beliefs tend to be based
on nonreligious propositions . . . are in practice suspiciously
unaffected by a rule that political argument must not be
religious.” 20 He concludes that our society should “be more tolerant
16. See Huyett, supra note 5, at 559–60.
17. Smolin, supra note 3, at 542.
18. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 485.
When [evangelicals] try to make religious values the touchstone for
debate, legal secularists tend to respond not by disagreeing with their
values but by dismissively telling them that those values have no place
in the public conversation—in other words, by telling them they are
breaking the rules of good citizenship.
NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT
WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 243–44 (2005).
19. He was “[r]aised and educated in a Modern Orthodox Jewish milieu.”
FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 16. Although disclosing that he hasn’t “always
remained squarely within the normative grounds of traditional Judaism” and
that he has also “studied and written about Islam,” id. at 17, Feldman apparently
still adhered to the Jewish faith when he wrote his book.
20. Id. at 225. This quote makes clear that Feldman recognizes that
secularists are motivated by their own values. It’s therefore unfortunate that he,
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of sincere religious people[’s] drawing on their beliefs and practices
to inform their choices in the public realm.” 21
2. Exclusionists Ask the Impossible of Religious Believers
Huyett argues that asking religious believers not to derive
political conclusions from their beliefs is “nonsense. It is not
logically possible to sincerely hold a belief while mentally
cordoning it off from the rest of one’s mind.” 22 To say “that ‘religion
has no place in politics’ . . . is [to] demand that religious people
adopt a sort of compulsory schizophrenia.” 23 Jon Meacham agrees:
“To believe something creates an obligation to make that belief
known and to act upon it within the arena.” 24
But, as Feldman observes, if believers decide to participate in
public policy debate, exclusionists demand that they “leave out the
religious basis for their most fundamental beliefs.” 25 Feldman
asks, though, “[w]hy would anyone wish to debate crucially
important subjects without the benefit of his foundational
commitments?” 26 Exclusionists thus would cut believers “off at the
knees, crippling their ability to participate fully.” 27
3. Exclusionists Ignore Their Own “Faiths”
in explaining his book as an attempt to promote reconciliation between “warring
factions” in the church-state debate, id. at 16, names the two factions “values
evangelicals” and “legal secularists.” Id. at 7–8. These two labels misleadingly
suggest that only evangelicals are values-driven.
21. Id. at 248; see id. at 16, 251. Feldman clearly practices what he preaches.
See Noah Feldman, The Pope’s Death Penalty Message Is for a Small Audience,
BLOOMBERG, (Aug, 2, 2018, 2:55 PM) https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2018-08-02/pope-francis-s-death-penalty-message-is-for-supreme-court (last
visited Dec. 18, 2018) (commenting favorably on the Pope’s declaring the death
penalty immoral under all circumstances) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
22. Huyett, supra note 5, at 558. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 485.
23. Huyett, supra note 5, at 558.
24. JON MEACHAM, THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE BATTLE FOR OUR BETTER
ANGELS 266 (2018).
25. FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 225.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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How clearly can secular philosophies be distinguished from
religious faith? Smolin argues that the former “increasingly tak[e]
the form and function of religion, with their own dogmas, vision of
good and evil, and narrative of origins and ends.” 28 Marxism, for
example, “has been plausibly labeled a secular religion.” 29 All “is
justified in the name of such [an] ideolog[y] because [it] admits no
ethical or religious system or higher power to which [it is]
accountable. Any means is permissible under the actual practice of
such [an] ideolog[y] because the ends are imperative and must be
achieved by human actions.” 30
But totalitarian systems perhaps aren’t the only “faith-based”
secular ideologies. Lance Morrow argues that “21st century
progressivism is also a religion—a militant faith, a true church in
nearly all important respects. It is a community of belief and
shared values, with dogmas, heresies, sacraments and fanatics;
with saints it reveres and devils it abhors . . . .” 31 Jillian Kay
28. Smolin, supra note 3, at 521; see id. at 532–33. Andrew Sullivan argues
that it’s “impossible not to have a religion if you are a human being. It’s in our
genes and has expressed itself in every culture, in every age, including our own
secularized husk of a society.” Andrew Sullivan, America’s New Religions, N.Y.
MAG. (Dec. 7, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/andrew-sullivanamericas-new-religions.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Sullivan defines religion as “a way of life that
gives meaning, a meaning that cannot really be defended without recourse to
some transcendent value, undying ‘Truth’ or God (or gods).” Id. Based on this
definition, Sullivan posits that “even today’s atheists are expressing an
attenuated form of religion. Their denial of any God is as absolute as others’ faith
in God, and entails just as much a set of values to live by—including, for some,
daily rituals like meditation, a form of prayer.” Id.
29. Smolin, supra note 3, at 521. Huyett persuasively refutes the charge that
“Marxism is an illegitimate child of the Christian faith.” See Huyett, supra note
5, at 555–57.
30. Smolin, supra note 3, at 533.
31. Lance Morrow, A Spectral Witness Materializes, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17,
2018, 7:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-spectral-witness-materializes1537225498 (last visited Dec. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). According to one scholar, secular humanism is also a religion:
[R]eligion is defined . . . as the beliefs about the source and content of
the rules of conduct that govern human behavior . . . . Because this
definition is not contingent on a continued belief that the source of
those rules is divine, it follows that all moral convictions are properly
classified as religious convictions . . . . Like other religions, secular
humanism constitutes a humanly authored system of beliefs about the
source of legal authority and the principles that should determine the
content of the law.

572

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 565 (2019)

Melchior suggests the same thing about the “intersectional
feminism” of bell hooks. 32 If these secular philosophies are indeed
“faiths,” logic would require that exclusionism also bar them from
public discourse.
4. Exclusionists Ignore the Societal Threat Their Position Poses
Smolin contends that “isolating and marginalizing [religious
citizens] outside of the peaceful processes of dialogue, debate,
speech, and politics heighten[]” the risk of societal unrest. 33 Those
who lose in a spirited, but fair, political fight are more inclined to
acquiesce in the outcome than those barred from participating. 34
Feldman agrees that exclusionists, by stifling full and open
political involvement by religious citizens, could unwittingly
motivate them to “demand a change to the rules of the game.” 35
Nomi M. Stolzenberg, From Eternity to Here: Divine Accommodation and the Lost
Language of Law, USC GOULD SCHOOL OF LAW: CTR. FOR L. & SOC. SCI., Legal
Studies Research Papers Series No. 18-28 (Sept. 25, 2018).
32. See Jillian Kay Melchior, A Prophet for the ‘Social Justice’ Movement,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2018, 6:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-prophet-forthe-social-justice-movement-1537481416?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1
(last visited Dec. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
[B]ell hooks was
[b]orn Gloria Jean Watkins in 1952, Ms. Hooks uses a lowercase pen
name “to focus attention on her message rather than
herself,” . . . . That message begins with “intersectionality” theory—
the claim that racism, sexism and similar types of oppression
compound each other’s effects—and advises social-justice warriors (or
SJWs) on how to respond.
Id.
33. Smolin, supra note 3, at 542. “It is a part of the genius of American
democracy to productively channel political divisions and conflicting interests
through inclusion and participation in a societal marketplace of ideas.” Id.
Smolin, though, also acknowledges that religion itself can stimulate societal
unrest if “it becomes intertwined with an ethnic or nationalistic identity, and the
accompanying faith, ethics, or teachings are weaker than the merged
religious-ethnic/nationalistic identity.” Id. at 538.
34. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 486 n.162.
35. FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 225. Smolin posits evangelicals’ major
support for Donald Trump, whom Smolin didn’t vote for and whose Presidency he
finds “destabilizing and offensive,” as another consequence of pushing them “to
the margins of society and delegitimiz[ing] their participation in political, public,
and economic life.” Smolin, supra note 3, at 530. If you so treat a group, “you
cannot expect their votes nor control to whom they go for assistance.” Id. For an
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5. Fears of Theocracy Are a Red Herring
Katherine Stewart, a frequent New York Times contributor,
greatly exaggerates the dangers of what she calls Christian
Nationalism. In a 2012 book, she describes Christian Nationalists
as those seeking to achieve “Christian control of all the important
parts of government and society.” 36 If the meaning of “control” is
somewhat vague in this quotation, elsewhere she’s clearer—
American Christian Nationalists can be equated with
fundamentalists “elsewhere in the world” who seek to make “their
state a theocracy.” 37 Stewart doesn’t claim that all conservative
Christians are Christian Nationalists, 38 but she nonetheless is
very distressed by a movement she believes is trying “to undermine
the foundations of modern secular democracy.” 39 She calls on
Americans to rise up in defense before “it’s too late.” 40
In this brief Essay, it’s difficult to fully engage Stewart’s
alarmist view. 41 Smolin acknowledges the existence of a Christian
theocratic position, but states that it’s “a tiny group and hence of
little political significance.” 42 He also makes clear that the future
insightful argument for the importance of distinguishing between political
evangelicals, i.e., those whom pollsters emphasize, and the larger group of
theological evangelicals, i.e., those defined by “a core set of beliefs,” see Timothy
Keller, Can Evangelicalism Survive Donald Trump and Roy Moore?, NEW YORKER
(Dec. 19, 2017) https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/can-evangelicalismsurvive-donald-trump-and-roy-moore (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. KATHERINE STEWART, THE GOOD NEWS CLUB: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT’S
STEALTH ASSAULT ON AMERICA’S CHILDREN 3 (2012).
37. Id. at 259.
38. Id. at 3. I’m one example of a conservative non-Nationalist Christian. See
infra notes 121–123 and accompanying text.
39. STEWART, supra note 36, at 7.
40. See id. at x, 259. For an earlier book on the perceived dangers of
Christian Nationalism, see MICHELLE GOLDBERG, KINGDOM COMING: THE RISE OF
CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM (2006).
41. I believe that Professor Noah Feldman would agree that Stewart
overstates the risks of theocracy. He emphasizes the significance of American
religious diversity during the Founding Era. See infra note 73. Today, the United
States is much more religiously diverse due to “the increasing presence of other
non-Christian religious minorities.” FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 241.
42. Smolin, supra note 3, at 540. In particular, Christian Reconstructionism,
which Stewart calls “the most austere and intellectually rigorous form of
Dominionism [“the idea that Christians should seek to dominate all aspects of
secular politics and society until the return of Christ,” STEWART, supra note 36, at
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for religion he envisions isn’t “state-supported religious
institutions,” but instead competition “for its very survival” in “a
marketplace of religious, philosophical, political and social
ideas.” 43 Stewart herself elsewhere uses the term “Christian
nationalist” to describe political activity that can’t plausibly be
labeled “theocratic,” e.g., pastors attempting “to mobilize
congregations to vote according to what they see as their biblical
values.” 44 During the Civil Rights Movement, didn’t Martin Luther
King seek laws that reflected biblical values? 45 And what about the
evangelical pastors and leaders who recently expressed “support
for ‘just, compassionate and welcoming policies toward refugees
and other immigrants’”? 46 Were King and the evangelicals
Christian Nationalists too? Would Stewart criticize them for
seeking a theocracy?
Stewart in fact is yet another exclusionist who doesn’t like
competing with values differing from hers. She makes this explicit:
“It would be a much nicer world if we could simply allow one
another to carry on in our personal [religious] beliefs and approach
policy questions . . . without regard to that private world.” 47 But
108–09], STEWART, id. at 109, Smolin characterizes as “a vanishingly small
proportion of Christianity . . . [that] lacks much in the way of denominational or
institutional structure.” Smolin, supra at 540 n.108.
43. Smolin, supra note 3, at 545.
44. Katherine Stewart, The Christian Right Adopts a 50-State Strategy, N.Y.
TIMES (June 20, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/opinion/christianright-evangelicals-midterms.html (last updated June 27, 2018) (last visited Dec.
19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). One wonders if
Stewart would also criticize the efforts of Muslim and Jewish religious leaders to
encourage voting by their congregations. See Deborah Barfield Berry, Midterms
2018: Faith leaders try creative steps to urge people to vote. ‘It is an act of worship’,
USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 2018, 6:32 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/politics/elections/2018/11/02/election-day-2018-faith-leaders-take-pulpitget-flocks-vote/1823233002/ (last updated Nov. 2, 2018, 1:21 PM) (last visited Dec.
19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 480–81.
46. Id. at 487–88. And what would Stewart say about United Methodist
Pastor Will Green, who in late October 2018 publicly interrupted then-Attorney
General Jeff Sessions with an admonition about immigration policy based on
Matthew 25:42-43? Shane Ryan, “I Was Hungry and You Did Not Feed Me”:
Methodist Pastor Confronts Jeff Sessions, PASTE (Oct. 30, 2018, 11:05 AM),
https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2018/10/i-was-hungry-and-you-did-notfeed-me-methodist-lea.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
47. STEWART, supra note 36, at xi. By this quote, Stewart also demonstrates
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policy questions must be approached from some values
perspective. Stewart, by stoking fears of theocracy, works
zealously to delegitimize religious values, thus clearing the path
for her own secular principles.
Although I’m in complete accord with Huyett’s and Smolin’s
anti-exclusionist arguments, some aspects of their papers raise
questions for me, and in a few instances, disagreement.
B. Questions/Disagreement
1. Huyett
Huyett argues that because “[n]o secular account of political
morality . . . can provide premises which are more tenable than
theistic ones,” 48 “secularists are no more justified in using their
own moral premises in policy arguments than are religious
believers.” 49 I believe that Huyett’s actual position is stronger than
he states. I posit that he, like I, believes that God offers the only
solid grounding for moral precepts—all secular foundations of
morality ultimately fail. 50 I disagree, however, with Huyett’s
suggestion that a God-based system resolves all difficulties in
grounding moral duties. 51 I also don’t understand Huyett’s
she’s quite willing to subject religious citizens to the “compulsory schizophrenia”
that Huyett finds objectionable. See supra text accompanying note 23.
48. Huyett, supra note 5, at 560.
49. Id.
50. For evidence demonstrating that Huyett would agree, see his criticism of
both nihilism, id. at 560–62, and of Platonic atheism. Id. at 562–63; see also id. at
564. For my views, see Samuel W. Calhoun, Grounding Normative Assertions:
Arthur Leff’s Still Irrefutable, But Incomplete, “Sez Who?” Critique, 20 J.L. &
RELIGION 31 (2004–05).
51. See Huyett, supra note 5, at 563–64. Although only God can firmly
ground normative claims, Calhoun, supra note 50, at 34–38, difficulties remain:
All God-grounded truth claims rest upon three critical presuppositions.
Each must be valid if God is to be of any help in grounding conceptions
of “the right.” The first is that there really is a God. The second is that
the God one looks to is the God who actually exists. The third is that
this true God communicates knowledge concerning “the right” in
incontestable ways.
Id. at 61 (citations omitted). Consequently, no “Christians, or those of any faith,
should expect their religious arguments to convince, on religious grounds, even
their fellow believers, much less people of other faiths or the non-religious.”
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characterizing exclusionism by atheists as “extravagant
dishonesty.” 52 Huyett argues that if atheists believe that all
religious beliefs are false, they should say so explicitly instead of
“obscur[ing] their true position” by supporting a “wall of
separation.” 53 But might not an atheist in good faith believe
(wrongly, I assert) that religious beliefs, true or not, shouldn’t
inform public policy due to existing constitutional constraints?
Finally, I’m not sure what Huyett means in saying that because
atheism is a false belief, it shouldn’t “inform public policy.” 54 I
expect not, but this language suggests that Huyett would erect his
own wall of separation. If so, he could rightly be accused of reverse
exclusionism.
Huyett devotes a substantial portion of his response to
demonstrating that worldwide, “for thousands of years, Christians
have advanced human liberty through the explicit application of
their faith to politics and law.” 55 This history isn’t directly relevant
to evaluating whether separation of church and state was meant
to separate religion from politics in the United States. 56
Nonetheless, Huyett’s argument provides extra-territorial support
for a sub-theme of my article—that, in the United States, believers’
open reliance upon their faith on public policy questions has been
broadly beneficial. 57 Huyett strengthens this conclusion with his
Samuel W. Calhoun, May the President Appropriately Invoke God? Evaluating the
Embryonic Stem Cell Vetoes, 10 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION ONLINE 1, 5–6 (2009).
52. Huyett, supra note 5, at 559.
53. Id. at 558–59.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 547–48. Among his examples are “the Dominicans—who were the
foremost critics of Spanish atrocities against American Indians.” Id. at 553.
Huyett relates that some scholars have attempted to de-Christianize a principal
Dominican reformer, Bartolomé de las Casas, by “detach[ing] him from church
history and reimagin[ing] him as a secular Enlightenment thinker.” Id. at 553–
54. This is reminiscent of the effort by some to downplay the Christian faith of
the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 481 n.133.
56. On the other hand, American history showing the continuous mixing of
religion and politics is directly relevant to accurately understanding the meaning
of separation of church and state.
57. My examples include Lincoln’s opposition to slavery, Calhoun, supra
note 1, at text accompanying notes 116–19, and Martin Luther King’s leadership
of the Civil Rights Movement. Id. at notes 127–32 & accompanying text.
Christianity’s beneficial impact is much broader. For example, Andrew Sullivan
describes its essential role in the development of liberal democracy itself, “as
many earlier liberals (Tocqueville, for example) understood.” Sullivan, supra note
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own contemporary American example of openly Christian political
activism, i.e., Charles Colson’s efforts to reform criminal justice. 58
Huyett’s ancient and modern examples support his assertion “that
Christianity has had a broadly constructive influence on Western
politics.” 59 He later makes an even stronger claim: “[No] force in
history [has] exercised so beneficial an influence on public policy
as Christianity.” 60 Although there is indeed powerful evidence of
Christianity’s overall positive impact on world affairs, 61 it must
not be forgotten that Christians unfortunately have sometimes
supported causes that virtually all Christians now agree were
morally wrong, e.g., the pro-slavery stance in the Civil War era.
2. Smolin
My Article relies upon the Declaration of Independence as
evidence that Thomas Jefferson “never intended to insulate
politics from religion.” 62 Smolin relies upon it as the source of “a
political creed that creates a specific relationship between religion
and politics”—that “[r]eligion . . . defines the proper purposes and
limits of politics.” 63 This particular relationship is established by
the Declaration’s most famous words, 64 which proclaim that
28.

Id.

It is Christianity that came to champion the individual conscience
against the collective, which paved the way for individual rights. It is
in Christianity that the seeds of Western religious toleration were first
sown. Christianity is the only monotheism that seeks no sway over
Caesar, that is content with the ultimate truth over the immediate
satisfaction of power. It was Christianity that gave us successive social
movements, which enabled more people to be included in the liberal
project, thus renewing it. It was on these foundations that liberalism
was built, and it is by these foundations it has endured.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Huyett, supra note 5, at 554–55.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 564.
See generally JEREMIAH J. JOHNSTON, UNIMAGINABLE: WHAT OUR WORLD
WOULD BE LIKE WITHOUT CHRISTIANITY (2017); D. JAMES KENNEDY & JERRY
NEWCOMBE, WHAT IF JESUS HAD NEVER BEEN BORN? (1994).
62. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 468–69.
63. Smolin, supra note 3, at 543.
64. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold
these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are
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“[h]umanity is endowed by our Creator with rights and equality,
and the purpose of government is to secure those rights.” 65
I completely agree with Smolin thus far. 66 But I disagree with
his interpreting the Declaration’s “reference to God as an
invitation to include whoever or whatever is understood as highest
and holy.” 67 This view strikes me as unpersuasive both historically
and logically. Smolin relies upon Jefferson’s primary authorship. 68
But Jefferson didn’t have in mind some amorphous notion of the
good. Instead, he envisioned an intervening God, whose wrath on
account of slavery Jefferson feared. 69
Smolin’s interpretation is also logically flawed. The “political
creed” that the Declaration established is convincing only if what
the Declaration declares is actually true, i.e., that a Creator really
did endow mankind with inalienable rights. 70 No firm grounding
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . . That to secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men . . . .”).
65. Smolin, supra note 3, at 543.
66. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 468.
67. Smolin, supra note 3, at 544.
68. See id. at 543–44.
69. “Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his
justice cannot sleep forever . . . .” THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA 163 (William Peden ed., 1955) (1787); see Calhoun, supra note 1, at 470.
Jefferson’s concern about God’s possible intervention in itself shows that Smolin
is incorrect to characterize Jefferson as a deist, see Smolin, supra note 3, at 544.
In fairness, I should point out that this description of Jefferson is widespread.
See, e.g., JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 259 (1997).
70. Smolin in effect asserts that Jefferson didn’t actually believe this, for he
(Smolin) states that God was invoked to signal that the Declaration’s “view of
politics” wasn’t “just an expediency in the shifting sands of changing political and
social arrangements, but a permanent understanding of the foundations and
purpose of politics, rooted in both whatever is highest and in our shared human
nature.” Smolin, supra note 3, at 543. But Jefferson didn’t choose his language
just to send the message Smolin describes. Jefferson chose it because he believed
it: The “only firm basis” for “the liberties of a nation” is “a conviction in the minds
of the people that these liberties are . . . the gift of God[.]” JEFFERSON, supra note
69, at 163. Although this quote doesn’t explicitly declare this to be Jefferson’s own
belief, the evidence is compelling that it was. In an 1817 letter, Jefferson stated
that evidence of the natural rights of “life, liberty . . . [and the] pursuit of
happiness, is not left to the feeble and sophistical investigations of reason but is
impressed on the sense of every man. [W]e do not claim these under the Charter
of kings or legislators; but under the king of kings.” Thomas Jefferson, Thomas
Jefferson to John Manners, 12 June 1817 (June 12, 1817), NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-11-02-
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for such rights can be found by asking, as Smolin does, “the ‘nones’
of our nation[,] who generally possess some kind of personal
spirituality,” to read “their own view of divinity or whatever is of
highest spiritual value into the Creator God of the text.” 71 This is
not to say that I disagree with Smolin’s ultimate conclusion that
the Declaration, because it acknowledges “the rights and equality
of all human beings . . . is broad enough to include those who do
not accept it as a matter of belief.” 72 But it was a complex mixture
of factors, not the Declaration, that ensured “that politics would
not try to enforce on the people a single religious vision.” 73
0360 (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). This perspective isn’t surprising—after all, the final Declaration draft
that Jefferson submitted to Congress spoke of Creator-endowed rights. PAULINE
MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 236
(1997) (Congress’s substitution of “certain” for “inherent,” id., leaves God as the
exclusive source of rights). Some, in what seems to be an attempt to mask
Jefferson’s belief in rights’ divine origin, stress that his rough draft described
Declaration-declared truths as “sacred and undeniable,” whereas the final draft
presented to Congress substituted “self-evident.” See Casey N. Cep, True Lies: Jill
Lepore excavates the history of America, down to its bedrock values, HARV. MAG.,
September–October 2018, at 64, 64–65. This change allegedly shows that “rights
were no longer ‘the stuff of religion’ but ‘the stuff of science.’” Id. at 65. Allen
Jayne, however, persuasively rebuts this interpretation: “The term ‘sacred’ would
have been a redundancy if used to mean that rights were God-given; the
statement that all men are equally ‘endowed by their Creator’ with ‘unalienable
Rights’ carries this meaning of the word.” ALLEN JAYNE, JEFFERSON’S
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS, PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 118–19
(1998).
71. Smolin, supra note 3, at 544 (A “none” is someone who reports no
religious affiliation. Becka Alper, Why America’s ‘Nones’ Don’t Identify with a
Religion, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 8, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/08/08/why-americas-nones-dont-identify-with-a-religion/ (last visited
Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). There’s all the
difference in the world between liberties grounded in a God who actually exists
versus “whoever or whatever is understood as highest and holy.” See supra text
accompanying note 67.
72. Smolin, supra note 3, at 544.
73. Id. Noah Feldman argues that “the politics of religious diversity” led the
Framers “to agree on enacting the principle of the liberty of conscience by
prohibiting a national establishment and protecting free exercise of religion.”
FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 42; see also id. at 46. Feldman explains:
The new form of government under consideration was intended to bind
together the states into a union that was more complete—“more
perfect”—than under the Articles of Confederation. The resulting
bound-together union would contain a degree of religious diversity
much greater than existed in any of the several states. Under these
conditions, various religious groups worried about the possibility—
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Professor Smolin’s and my articles reveal a different
emphasis. We focus on a different segment of the spectrum of what
I’ve called exclusionists. At one extreme are those who may be
deeply religious, but still believe good reasons exist for separating
religion from politics. 74 At the other extreme are those with deep
hostility toward religion. My piece is more concerned with the
former, 75 whereas Smolin’s article emphasizes the latter. 76 After
memorably abridging the Dawkins-Harris-Hitchens stance—“If
religion is a ‘delusion’ ‘that poisons everything,’ the best result is
‘the end of faith’” 77—Smolin asserts that for those with this
perspective “separating religion from politics is part of a larger
agenda of stigmatizing, isolating, and privatizing religion so that
it may be safely relegated to the margins and then hopefully die
out.” 78 I don’t know which type of exclusionism predominates.
Smolin, though, makes an important contribution by
demonstrating that hostile exclusionists aren’t limited to a few
virulent secularists like Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens. 79 He
unlikely to be sure—of the federal government coming under the
control of some other particular denomination. This made them
especially eager to prohibit this eventuality in constitutional terms.
Id. at 43–44. But Madison believed that religious diversity itself, not the Bill of
Rights, was most important: “[W]ithout religious diversity to ensure
nonestablishment from the practical standpoint, a constitutional amendment
would do no good, since it would be ignored by the majority.” Id. at 45.
74. Professor Barnes is one example, as I once was. See supra text
accompanying note 2.
75. I don’t completely ignore those hostile to religion. My article, for example,
charges Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and the late-Christopher Hitchens with
launching “a rhetorical war of extermination against God.” Calhoun, supra note
1, at 465 (quoting Calhoun, Embryonic Stem Cell Vetoes, supra note 51, at 6). But
I also state that my interest in investigating the true meaning of separation of
church and state was prompted by religious students who believe the doctrine
prevents their using law to implement faith-based public policy goals. See
Calhoun, supra note 1, at 460–61. And it’s not just students who feel this
constraint on faith-based political action. A Christian professor once told me she
refrained from bringing her personal pro-life views into the political realm due to
the concept of separation of church and state.
76. Smolin’s present piece focuses on hostile secularists. In an article
published over twenty-five years ago, he responded to a religious exclusionist, i.e.,
me at that point in time. See David M. Smolin, The Enforcement of Natural Law
by the State: A Response to Professor Calhoun, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 381 (1991).
77. Smolin, supra note 3, at 519.
78. Id.
79. If “virulent” seems an overstatement, consider how Dawkins’s, Harris’s,
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stresses that “a significant number of scholars and academics most
likely view certain prevalent religions in the United States as bad
and harmful actors, and largely illegitimate participants in public
life.” 80 This belief in part explains “the political and legal theories
claiming that political involvement by evangelical Christians,
traditionalist Roman Catholics, and other such groups is
illegitimate.” 81
Given that hostile exclusionism is widespread, 82 it’s especially
important that its weaknesses be exposed. As previously shown,
and Hitchens’s opinions of God, expressed in their own words, would impact the
Declaration of Independence:
A “pernicious delusion,” not our “Creator,” made all men equal and
gave them “unalienable Rights.” An “ancient man-made deit[y,]” not
“Nature’s God,” is now the source of “the Laws of Nature.” The
signatories no longer appeal to the “Supreme Judge of the World,” but
to “the offal of the ancient world.” And the signatories, instead of
relying
upon
“divine
Providence,”
now
invoke
“our
prehistory . . . [failing to] to escape the gnarled hands which reach out
to drag us back to the catacombs and the reeking altars and the guilty
pleasures of subjection and abjection.”
Calhoun, Embryonic Stem Cell Vetoes, supra note 51, at 7–8 (citations omitted).
80. Smolin, supra note 3, at 531.
81. Id.
82. Smolin gives other reasons for believers to be alarmed. “[A]cademic
theories of political exclusion are part of a much larger set of messengers
communicating to evangelicals, conservative Roman Catholics, and others that
they will be excluded and marginalized if they adhere to their faith.” Id. at 528.
One example Smolin mentions is Senator Bernie Sanders’s nomination hearing
condemnation of Russell Vought, who nonetheless was confirmed as the Deputy
Director of the Office of Management and Budget. See id. at 528–29 & 529 n.64.
The startling thing about this incident is that Sanders declared Vought unfit for
public office not because of his stance on some controversial public policy issue,
but due to the unremarkable fact that he, a Christian, professed belief in
Christianity’s core doctrine—the Gospel message, i.e., that the only way for sinful
mankind to be restored to a relationship with a Holy God is an individual’s
accepting by faith that Jesus Christ paid the penalty for one’s sin by dying on the
Cross. See Emma Green, Bernie Sanders’s Religious Test for Christians in Public
Office, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2017/06/bernie-sanders-chris-van-hollen-russell-vought/529614/ (last updated at June
8, 2018, 11:40 AM) (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). For a powerful refutation of Senator Sanders’s conclusions, see
Johnny Rex Buckles, Unashamed of the Gospel of Jesus Christ: On Public Policy
and Public Service by Evangelicals, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 813 (2018).
Buckles concludes by offering assurance to “evangelicals and other orthodox
Christians considering whether to endure the possible spectacle of subjecting
themselves to . . . antagonistic questioning.” Id. at 899. “[N]o legitimate public
policy rationale disqualifies them from serving their country merely because of
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Huyett and Smolin admirably do just that. Professor Barnes,
though, an exclusionist principally due to devotion to his Christian
faith, offers a different challenge to a critic of exclusionism. It’s to
Barnes’s advocacy for exclusionism that I now turn.
III. Does Christian Doctrine Require Separating Religion From
Politics?
Professor Wayne Barnes’s response differs dramatically from
those of Huyett and Smolin. They basically agree with me that
religious citizens should feel free to advocate on public policy issues
with explicitly religious arguments. 83 Barnes, an evangelical
Christian himself, 84 disagrees with respect to Christians. For
theological reasons, he believes Christians shouldn’t make
explicitly faith-based arguments in the public square.
Barnes’s theological argument is his primary response to the
third prong of my defense of religious arguments in public policy
disputes, i.e., that “no other reasons justify barring faith-based
arguments from the public square.” 85 Before evaluating his stance,
I’ll briefly address his comments on my first two assertions, i.e.,
(1) “the Founders didn’t intend to separate religion from politics;” 86
and (2) “religion and politics have been continuously intermixed
since the Founding.” 87
Regarding the “the Founders’ intent with respect to separation
of religion and politics,” 88 Professor Barnes rightly points out that
the First Amendment restricts only “government behavior.” 89
Thus, he asserts, separation of church and state, even if accepted
their faith-based commitments. Rather, they can face their inquisitors with full
confidence in their theology of love and hope for all of humanity . . . .” Id.
83. Whether actually to use openly religious arguments in a particular
situation calls for the exercise of prudent political judgment. See Calhoun, supra
note 1, at 483 n.150.
84. See e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Render Unto Rawls: Law, Gospel, and the
Evangelical Fallacy, 24 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 235, 237, 243–44 (2013).
85. See supra text accompanying note 10.
86. See supra text accompanying note 8.
87. See supra text accompanying note 9.
88. Wayne R. Barnes, The Paradox of Christian-Based Political Advocacy: A
Reply to Professor Calhoun, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 489, 491 (2018).
89. Id. at 494.
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as capturing the Amendment’s meaning, “does not technically
apply to individuals’ political argumentation at all.” 90 I agree, but,
based on personal experience, I know that the imagery of
separation can constrain individuals’ political behavior even
though that result is indefensible as a matter of constitutional
law. 91 Consequently, what Jefferson meant by his metaphor
remains an important question. 92
Barnes “fully agree[s]” that religion and politics have been
continuously mixed in American life. 93 He also provides a useful
catalog of contemporary examples from both conservative 94 and
liberal “Christian political activists.” 95 Although embracing “this
reality”—“intermixing of religion and politics . . . has happened
throughout history, continues to happen, and will likely go on
happening, regardless of what is said here” 96—Barnes opposes
such intermingling, in part due to “Rawlsian liberalism,” but
mainly for Christian theological reasons. 97 On these two grounds,
he thus rejects my assertion that “no other reasons justify barring
faith-based arguments from the public square.” 98 I respectfully
disagree with Barnes on both points.
A. Rawlsian Liberalism Doesn’t Justify Exclusionism
Professor Barnes still adheres to the Rawlsian critique of
religious political discourse. 99 Religious arguments are

90. Id.
91. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 460–61; supra note 75.
92. The evidence demonstrates that Jefferson’s “wall was meant to insulate
religious belief and practices from legislative interference, not to separate religion
from politics.” Calhoun, supra note 1, at 467 (citations omitted). Professor Noah
Feldman agrees. See FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 38–40.
93. Barnes, supra note 88, at 491 (“the evidence is paramount”); see also id.
at 495 (“How could one argue?”); id. at 503 (explicitly religious “political
argumentation . . . [has been common] throughout our nation’s history”).
94. Id. at 497–500.
95. Id. at 500–03.
96. Id. at 491.
97. See id. at 492–93; Barnes, supra note 84, at 236–37, 243.
98. Id. at 491–92.
99. See id. at 505.
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“inaccessible,” 100 “much of the citizenry does not share [a] common
religious viewpoint,” 101 and religious worldviews aren’t “readily
subject to compromise.” 102 I’m not surprised that Professor Barnes
was unmoved by my article’s brief critique of Rawls. 103 Perhaps
Professor Noah Feldman’s observations will be more convincing.
Feldman challenges legal secularists who assert “that religion is a
‘conversation stopper.’” 104 He argues “that imagining religion to be
the end of the political conversation represents a serious
misunderstanding of the nature of religious belief, its capacity to
change, and its relation to democratic politics.” 105 Feldman
describes many ways of engaging a religious believer in political
dialogue. 106 Consequently, “the notion that political debate must
be secular in order to keep democratic deliberation going is
misplaced.” 107
It’s significant to note that Barnes’s view is substantially more
restrictive of Christian public advocacy than Rawls’s ultimate
position. Rawls would allow religious arguments as long as they
are supplemented within a reasonable time by non-religious
ones. 108 Barnes, however, would prohibit all “overt Christian
political advocacy.” 109 He thus “out-Rawls” Rawls. But Barnes’s
more restrictive view doesn’t reflect disagreement with Rawls
regarding what being a good citizen demands. Instead, Barnes
emphasizes a theological defense of exclusionism. He asserts
problems with explicitly Christian advocacy “from within

100. Id. at 491.
101. Id. at 492.
102. Id. at 505.
103. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 482–83. Rawlsism’s unfairness toward
religious believers is also part of my critique. See supra notes 16–21 and
accompanying text. For Professor Smolin’s criticism of Rawlsian and similar
approaches, see Smolin, supra note 3, at 512–13 & 513 n.4.
104. FELDMAN, supra note 18, at 225.
105. Id. at 225–26.
106. See id. at 226–27.
107. Id. at 227.
108. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 482. I know from personal interaction with
Professor Barnes that he’s aware of this facet of Rawlsism. It’s my understanding
that Barnes omitted this point from his article due to space limitations.
109. Barnes, supra note 88, at 504. “Overtly Christian” means arguments “for
law and public policy on the basis of explicit religious and Christian rationales.” Id.
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Christian orthodoxy itself.” 110 I once held a similar view, but I do
no longer.
B. Christian Doctrine Doesn’t Require Separating Religion From
Politics
I begin by expressing my sincere gratitude to Professor Barnes
for his theological argument. It forces me to give a theological
defense of my changed views, which I’ve previously explained
largely in secular terms. 111 Mainly, however, I appreciate Barnes’s
love for and devotion to the Christian Gospel—“For God so loved
the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes
in him shall not perish but have eternal life.” 112
I too love the Gospel because it’s “the power of God that brings
salvation to everyone who believes.” 113 This fact makes it
especially difficult for me to read the various ways Barnes
describes the Gospel-obscuring impact of my current position:
(1) “it miscommunicates the central Christian belief of how to
obtain favor with God”; 114 (2) it wrongly communicates “Christian
doctrine”; 115 (3) what I argue is “antithetical to Christian
doctrine”; 116 (4) public Christian political advocacy communicates
“a false message about the central tenet and hope of Christian
doctrine”; 117 (5) my view presents “a tragically mistaken view of
110. Id. at 493.
111. See, e.g., Calhoun, Embryonic Stem Cell Vetoes, supra note 51. I have,
however, previously expressed some religious objections to non-imposition.
Calhoun, supra note 1, at 462 n.6.
112. John 3:16 (NIV); see supra note 82.
113. Romans 1:16. “Far from carrying any negative implications about God’s
love for those outside the fold of the Christian faith, evangelical soteriology is
founded on God’s love for people who have yet to embrace Christ the Savior.”
Buckles, supra note 82, at 896–97.
114. Barnes, supra note 88, at 492. Because these theological reasons “are
unique to Christianity,” they are also “unique to Christians invoking their beliefs
for political argumentation.” Id. at 493. Barnes therefore has “nothing to say
about legal arguments from other religious traditions.” Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 503.
117. Id. at 504. Barnes’s assertion explains the word, “paradox,” in his title:
“well-meaning Christians like [Sam Calhoun]” make explicitly Christian political
arguments, presumably in part motivated by the desire to advance Christianity,
but, by so doing, they actually undermine the core Christian message. See id. at
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Christianity”; 118 (6) “Christian political advocacy is ‘at odds with
the Gospel’”; 119 and (7) such advocacy gives “the wrong message to
the public about what Christianity has to say about obtaining favor
with God.” 120 Wow. Can my present view really be so
Gospel-obscuring? If so, I would repudiate it at once. But I’m not
convinced.
To begin, it’s important to say that I agree with Professor
Barnes that Jesus’ kingdom is not of this world. 121 I therefore also
agree that Christians’ “higher calling” is to share the Gospel, not
seek “to impose a legislated morality of works via the secular
state.” 122 Rather than seeking political power, Christians’ first
priority should be to bear witness to a fallen world of the love of
God. We should strive to enhance the attractiveness of the Gospel
by demonstrating God’s love ourselves. As we grow in
Christ-likeness by applying biblical principles through the power
of the Holy Spirit, we’re more and more able to emulate Jesus by
loving others through acts of service and mercy. 123 This doesn’t
mean, however—and I think Barnes would agree—that Christians
are prohibited from participating in public policy disputes. Our
disagreement concerns the appropriateness of political advocacy
that’s explicitly faith-based. He believes Christians should never
use overt religious arguments, whereas I think an absolute
prohibition is unwarranted.
Professor Barnes’s core argument is that openly Christian
political advocacy of godly conduct masks the Gospel truth that
492.
118. Id. at 507.
119. Id. at 509 (quoting Samuel W. Calhoun, Misreading the Judeo-Christian
Tradition and the Law: A Response to Professor Smolin, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV.
383, 398 (1990)).
120. Id. at 510.
121. Barnes, supra note 88, at 510 (citing John 18:36 (ESV)).
122. Id.
123. Christians won’t benefit society “unless we do believe Jesus died for us,
unless we do believe that we live through the self-sacrifice of the great Jesus
Christ, and therefore we’re going to live by self-sacrifice.” Tim Keller, Tim Keller’s
Message to the UK Church: Stand Apart from Culture or Risk Being Ineffective,
PREMIER CHRISTIANITY (June 20, 2018), https://www.premierchristianity.
com/Blog/Tim-Keller-s-message-to-the-UK-Church-Stand-apart-from-culture-orrisk-being-ineffective (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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trusting Jesus Christ as Savior is the exclusive path for sinful man
to be reconciled to a Holy God. 124 A major obstacle I face in
rebutting him is that I once said something very similar:
The heart of the Christian message is that the only way to
righteousness before God is through faith in Jesus Christ, who
on the Cross paid the penalty for sin. Emphasis upon human
law as the road to righteousness perpetuates a cruel delusion,
like the story of Scrooge at Christmastime. Both direct people’s
attention to their own conduct as the avenue to acceptability
before God, when in truth acceptability lies only in trusting
Jesus Christ as Savior. 125

Barnes, understandably, isn’t about to let me forget my past views.
His response twice quotes my earlier position. 126 He thus squarely
(and fairly) confronts me with the unavoidable question—Why do
I now believe that openly Christian political advocacy doesn’t
undermine the Gospel?
I’ll start by noting that my prior position imposed a greater
constraint on Christians’ political activity than Barnes’s view. My
“non-imposition principle” focused not on the rhetoric of political
advocacy, 127 but instead upon its underlying reasons—Christians
should refrain from seeking laws implementing faith-based
concepts unless secular reasons, standing alone, justified their
support. 128 Barnes, however, focuses exclusively on rhetoric. He
doesn’t “advocate that Christians strip God and Christian beliefs
from their private thinking about political and legal issues, but
rather only from their public communications and advocacy of such
issues.” 129 Barnes is concerned about what’s expressed when
124. Barnes, supra note 88, at 492–93, 507–08, 509.
125. Calhoun, supra note 2, at 306 (in an earlier work, Barnes quoted this
language in full. Barnes, supra note 84, at 262). To Christians, “[c]onduct is
important, not as the avenue to God, but as the response of a grateful heart to
God’s provision of the only way to Him—Jesus Christ.” Calhoun, supra at 306; see
also Barnes, supra note 88, at 509 n.72.
126. Barnes, supra note 88, at 507, 509; see supra note 125.
127. My non-imposition article didn’t discuss the issue. Calhoun, supra note
2, at 309 n.132.
128. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 462 n.6.
129. Barnes, supra note 88, at 507 n.64 (This quote makes clear that Barnes
advocates only a linguistic separation between Christianity and politics. Given
that his view allows Christians to ground their public policy positions in their
faith, see also Barnes, supra note 84, at 168, some might contend that he’s not
really an exclusionist at all.). I eventually found “abhorrent” that I once urged
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Christians argue “that a certain law or public policy is needed
because of some Christian principle[.]” 130 The message “implicitly
communicated” is that “if I behave according to the proposed
‘Christian’ principles being advocated for, I will obtain greater
favor with God.” 131 It’s this message that so undermines the
Christian Gospel. 132
Barnes’s position permits Christians not to disclose the true
motivation for their political advocacy—Christian doctrine might
be the real reason for a believer’s public policy positions, but any
publicly expressed support for those views is restricted to secular
terminology. For three reasons, I would’ve thought it better to be
forthright about one’s reasons for taking a public stance. First,
simple honesty dictates that one be transparent about one’s
motivations. 133 Second, in keeping silent about the true source of
their moral views, Christians take personal credit for a stance
when that credit properly belongs to God. Third, not mentioning
Christian doctrine squanders the opportunity “to bear witness to
the world of the reality of God.” 134 Barnes, however, discourages
religious terminology because he views it as undermining the

Christians “to strip God from their thoughts” to apply my non-imposition
principle. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 462 n.6.
130. Barnes, supra note 88, at 504; see also supra note 109 and accompanying
text.
131. Barnes, supra note 88, at 506; see also id. at 509.
132. See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text.
133. I’ve praised President George W. Bush for his transparency in expressing
his faith during the embryonic stem cell veto controversy. Calhoun, Embryonic
Stem Cell Vetoes, supra note 51, at 4 n.16.
134. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 463 n.11.
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Gospel. 135 The “central tenet and hope of Christian doctrine” must
be preserved. 136
From past personal experience, I know that protecting the
Gospel message is a powerful motivation. I proposed and advocated
the non-imposition principle despite counterarguments much like
the criticism that I now assert against exclusionism. For example,
I defended my principle against assertions that Christians couldn’t
distinguish between faith-based and secular reasoning; 137 that it
was wrong to demand that they even try to compartmentalize their
lives; 138 and that it was unfair to ask Christians to justify
themselves on purely secular grounds when non-believers are
allowed to rely upon their ultimate values in advocating on public
policy issues. 139 These criticisms didn’t sway me because I, like
Barnes, believe that for Christians fidelity to the Gospel is a
paramount value. 140
135. See supra text accompanying notes 130–132. I ask Barnes to consider
how his position might impact Christian pastors. Assume a pastor who wants to
advocate regarding a public policy controversy. Mindful of Barnes’s concerns, the
pastor makes no religious arguments. First, this silence would presumably strike
most people as extraordinarily odd—“Surely the pastor must have some thoughts
about how Christian teachings relate to the issue in dispute. How strange then
that the pastor doesn’t communicate them.” Second, I don’t think the pastor’s
total refraining from religious language would satisfy Barnes’s view of what’s
needed to protect the Gospel. By definition, everyone knows the pastor is a
Christian. If the pastor takes a position on a public dispute implicating justice,
right and wrong, etc., everyone would automatically assume that the pastor
considered the stance taken as consistent with Christian principles.
Consequently, even the pastor’s totally eschewing religious rhetoric still involves
the miscommunication that Barnes fears. The only apparent solution would be
for the pastor never to take a public position on a controversial policy issue. And
why wouldn’t such silence also be necessary for any citizen publicly known to be
a Christian? See infra notes 162–164 and accompanying text.
136. Barnes, supra note 88, at 504. I also wonder how Barnes would handle
the Declaration of Independence. I rely on the Declaration—which emphasizes
Creator-endowed inalienable rights—as demonstrating that the Founders didn’t
intend to separate religion from politics. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 468–69. But
wouldn’t Barnes have to declare the Declaration’s most famous language off limits
to Christians? I say this because, under his view, a Christian’s referring to it
would risk peoples’ thinking that promoting life, liberty, and/or the pursuit of
happiness would enhance their standing with the Creator.
137. Calhoun, supra note 2, at 309–15.
138. Id. at 315–16.
139. Id. at 317.
140. Keep in mind that my non-imposition principle is more restrictive of
Christian advocacy than Barnes’s position. Supra notes 127–129 and
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This brings me back to the question I posed earlier—Why do I
now believe that openly Christian political advocacy doesn’t
undermine the Gospel? Huyett’s response is a good place to start.
He relates Archbishop Ambrose’s denying communion to the
Emperor Theodosius for ordering a brutal massacre. 141 In
explaining his actions, Ambrose said that “[h]aving heard of the
massacre, he could not ‘close [his] ears with wax.’” 142 Had he kept
silent, his conscience would’ve made him “wretched.” 143 Ambrose
also relied upon Ezekiel 3:18: “If I [God] say to the wicked, ‘You
shall surely die,’ and you give him no warning . . . that wicked
person shall die for his iniquity, but his blood I will require at your
hand.” 144
The Bible plainly teaches that God punishes both individual
and corporate sin through devastating temporal consequences. 145
Jesus explicitly makes this point for individuals. 146 Warning
regarding corporate sin is provided by the “great flood in Noah’s
day and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah in Abraham’s.” 147
accompanying text. From zeal to protect the Gospel, I nonetheless proposed and
defended it.
141. Huyett, supra note 5, at 548.
142. Id. at 550.
143. Id.
144. Id. Hundreds of years later, Pope Gregory VII cited the same verse in
excommunicating the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV for resisting “a push to end
government control of internal church appointments.” Id. at 552. The Ezekiel
passage speaks to failure to warn. God also holds us responsible for failure to
rescue. See Proverbs 24: 11-12 (NIV).
145. Terrible circumstances don’t always reflect God’s punishment for sin. For
example, the Scriptures teach that God uses hardship to help Christians mature
in their faith. E.g., Hebrews 12:7-11 (NIV); James 1:2-4 (NIV). The Bible, however,
is clear that nothing happens, good or bad, outside the sovereignty of God. E.g.,
Ecclesiastes 7:14 (NIV); Isaiah 45:7 (NIV); Lamentations 3:38 (NIV).
146. Luke 13:1-5. See also Lamentations 3:38-39 (NIV) (“Is it not from the
mouth of the Most High that both calamities and good things come? Why should
the living complain when punished for their sins?”).
147. Calhoun, supra note 2, at 306 (citations omitted). Another example is
Israel’s taking possession of the Promised Land. The displaced nations were
driven out “on account of [their] wickedness.” Deuteronomy 9:1-4 (NIV). Francis
Schaeffer well describes how God’s judgment sometimes comes:
I imagine myself holding a cup which has water dripping into it. The
water does not come quickly, but I keep holding the cup. Gradually the
water rises, and at a certain point it flows over the brim. This is the
principle of the judgment of God: Man is in revolt against God, and God
waits in longsuffering until every possibility of man’s turning back is
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Each exemplifies “God’s judgment against mankind based upon
conduct which was abhorrent to Him. Each shows that God in His
evaluation of human societies does draw distinctions based upon
conduct alone.” 148 Jefferson’s fear of God’s wrath due to slavery
demonstrates he believed this. 149 And so did Abraham Lincoln,
who believed the Civil War to be God’s judgment upon the nation
for the sin of slavery. The Second Inaugural powerfully expresses
this view, 150 but Lincoln foreshadowed it over a year earlier, in his
Proclamation Appointing a National Fast Day. In this March 31,
1863 document, Lincoln acknowledges that Almighty God, “by His
divine law,” subjects “nations like individuals . . . to punishments
and chastisements in this world.” 151 Consequently, “may we not
justly fear that the awful calamity of civil war, which now desolates
the land, may be but a punishment, inflicted upon us, for our
presumptuous sins, to the needful end of our national reformation
as a whole People?” 152 Lincoln therefore designated “a day of
national humiliation, fasting and prayer.” 153 He closed by urging
all the People . . . [to] rest humbly in the hope authorized by the
Divine teachings, that the united cry of the Nation will be heard
on high, and answered with blessings, no less than the pardon
of our national sins, and the restoration of our now divided and
suffering Country, to its former happy condition of unity and
peace. 154

exhausted. When the iniquity is full, when the cup overflows, God’s
judgment comes.
FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER, JOSHUA AND THE FLOW OF BIBLICAL HISTORY 66–67 (1976).
For the concept of God’s waiting to judge until “iniquity is full,” see Genesis 15:16
(NIV).
148. Calhoun, supra note 2, at 306 (citations omitted). At the time, this
argument didn’t blunt my adherence to the non-imposition principle. Id. at 306–
07.
149. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 470.
150. See id. at 476–77.
151. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation Appointing A National Fast Day (Mar.
31, 1863), in VI THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 155–56 (Roy P.
Basler ed., 1953).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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Given that Lincoln spoke of God’s “punishments and
chastisements in this world,” 155 I don’t think anyone would’ve
viewed his proclamation as referring to one’s eternal salvation.
Rather, the natural interpretation would’ve been that Lincoln was
speaking of God’s interaction with humans in this life. By declaring
the fast day, Lincoln wanted both to turn aside God’s negative
intervention and to encourage His blessings right here on earth.
The impact of Christian public advocacy should be viewed in
the same way. Barnes fears a false message—that “if I behave
according to the proposed ‘Christian’ principles being advocated
for, I will obtain greater favor with God.” 156 But even if this
accurately describes peoples’ likely reaction, they’d almost
certainly associate “greater favor” with earthly conditions, not
their eternal destiny. 157 So interpreted, Christian advocacy poses
no threat to obscure the Gospel.
I anticipate Barnes’s replying that, despite my argument,
“greater favor” will most likely be associated with the afterlife.
That’s, of course, possible. 158 Even if so, however, it’s not certain
that the message would be the destructive one Barnes fears, i.e., a
person’s believing that improved behavior will get them into
Heaven. The Bible teaches that one purpose of God’s moral law is
to reveal sin: “Therefore no one will be declared righteous in God’s
sight by the works of the law; rather, through the law we become
conscious of our sin.” 159 This verse reveals the error in Barnes’s
position. The passage begins by endorsing his stance that good
behavior won’t restore one’s relationship with God. If Barnes’s
155. Id.
156. Barnes, supra note 88, at 506.
157. Given Barnes’s agreement with Rawls that religious arguments are
“inaccessible,” id. at 491, it’s somewhat puzzling that he anticipates secular
citizens’ giving any theological interpretation to explicitly Christian political
advocacy. If, however, they should do so, I believe the interpretation I describe is
more likely (although in my non-imposition days I agreed with Barnes).
158. Barnes and I both may be overly optimistic about the degree that secular
citizens pay attention to religious arguments. Maybe the non-religious in effect
close their ears to religious talk in the public square. This fear is a reason for
believers to consider framing their policy arguments in secular terms. Calhoun,
supra note 1, at 483 n.150. If, however, a secular citizen’s interest in Christianity
were triggered by religious public arguments, isn’t it likely that person would end
up talking to Christians and/or going to church? If so, correct information
regarding what’s needed for personal salvation would hopefully then be conveyed.
159. Romans 3:20 (NIV).
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view were correct, one would expect the verse next to admonish us
to refrain from urging people to obey God’s law—from concern
they’d be misled into thinking that good behavior was the route to
God. Instead, the verse proclaims knowledge of the moral law as
vital to making us aware of our sin. 160 God’s moral law, then,
rather than undermining the Gospel, is an indispensable
component of that conviction of sin required for recognizing one’s
need of a Savior. 161
I’d also ask Barnes to consider a final passage that I think
casts doubt upon his position: “Live such good lives among the
pagans that, though they accuse you of doing wrong, they may see
your good deeds and glorify God on the day he visits us.” 162 Why
would God command us to live good lives before “pagans,” i.e.,
unbelievers, if doing so necessarily undermines the Gospel by
miscommunicating the path to a restored relationship with Him?
I’m sure that Barnes, like me, strives to live a life honoring to
Christ. 163 Non-Christians hopefully find things to admire in our
behavior, perhaps even conduct to emulate. Are we both then
miscommunicating the Gospel because our observers may

160. “Nevertheless, I would not have known what sin was had it not been for
the law.” Romans 7:7 (NIV).
161. “So the law was put in charge to lead us to Christ that we might be
justified by faith.” Galatians 3:24 (NIV). I realize there’s a major difference
between Scriptures describing the role of God’s moral law in salvation and my
argument that man’s law, promoted via overtly Christian arguments, could be
used to convict others of their sin. For one thing, Christians, however
well-intentioned, have no doubt sometimes advocated for laws that don’t reflect
God’s will. In addition, how likely is it that advocating for even a godly law would
actually convict another of sin? As a friend puts it, wouldn’t non-Christians more
likely be annoyed by overt Christian political activity?—“Here’s somebody who
has ‘straight from the mountain-top’ views about right and wrong who’s trying to
force them down my throat by seizing the reins of power and adopting the morals
and practices dictated by his religious beliefs into law for the whole nation.”
E-mail from Professor David Eggert to Professor Samuel W. Calhoun (Nov. 16,
2018) (on file with the Author). These are valid points, but the fact is that the
Bible speaks plainly of a relationship between salvation and knowledge of God’s
moral law. It’s thus a certainty, however unlikely it may seem, that God could use
overtly Christian advocacy for a human law—assuming one that actually reflects
His will—as part of a process to lead someone to faith in Christ.
162. 1 Peter 2:12 (NIV).
163. See Colossians 3:17 (NIV); 1 Peter 1:15; 4:11 (NIV); Romans 12:1 (NIV).
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mistakenly assume that following our example is the way to please
God? 164
Barnes’s devotion to the Gospel is highly commendable. But
he pays insufficient attention to biblical calls to encourage godly
behavior in non-believing individuals and nations. Doing so could
forestall God’s temporal judgment on both and might also be used
by God to show people their need of a Savior. Barnes, although
motivated by compassion for others, is also too anxious that some
misstep by Christians could ultimately thwart God’s saving
mercy. 165 As Jesus said,
My sheep listen to my voice; I know them, and they follow me. I
give them eternal life . . . no one can snatch them out of my
hand. My Father, who has given them to me, is greater than all;
no one can snatch them out of my Father’s hand. 166

God’s ultimate sovereignty regarding salvation doesn’t relieve
Christians of the obligation and privilege of sharing the Gospel as
He gives us the opportunity. But Christians’ responsibility to
spread the Gospel doesn’t negate our freedom, if so guided by
prudent political judgment, to openly appeal to Christian
principles in public policy disputes.
IV. Conclusion
Participating in this roundtable has been an enjoyable,
challenging, and personally meaningful experience. I once again
164. For those who observe us unseen, avoiding this risk seems impossible.
For observers we know, wouldn’t avoiding it require our sharing the Gospel with
everyone we meet? I know I don’t do so. If Barnes doesn’t either, wouldn’t such a
failure reveal a major inconsistency between his personal life and his stance on
openly religious arguments in the public square?
165. Barnes views any overtly Christian political advocacy as catastrophic,
not merely mistaken. See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text. As this
piece makes clear, I now disagree with his categorical repudiation of such
advocacy.
166. John 10:27-29 (NIV). This isn’t the place for a full discussion of Reformed
Theology, which, relying upon multiple biblical passages, teaches that salvation
is totally the work of God in a person’s heart. E.g., Ephesians 2:3-5 (NIV); John
1:10-13 (NIV). Barnes is correct that to be saved an individual must accept Jesus
by faith. Barnes, supra note 88, at 493, 508, 509. But Barnes is also right to say
that faith itself “is the gift of God.” Id. at 508–09 (quoting Ephesians 2:8-9 (ESV));
see also John 6:44, 65.
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thank my three respondents for their prior and future
contributions. 167 Rather than recapitulate all the arguments I’ve
made, I instead will conclude with someone else’s thoughts that
well express my present position regarding Christian participation
in public policy disputes.
Tim Keller is the founder and Pastor Emeritus of the
Redeemer Presbyterian Churches of New York City. In June 2018,
Keller addressed the Parliamentary Prayer Breakfast in London:
“What Can Christianity Offer Our Society in the 21st Century?” 168
Keller’s focus was Jesus’ calling Christians to be “the salt of the
earth.” 169 “[I]n every society . . . [Christians] should be bringing
out the best in that particular culture and preventing its worse
tendencies . . . .” 170
Keller describes many instances of Christians’ “bringing out
the best in Western society.” 171 Christianity produced the societal
transition from a “‘shame and honour’ culture, in which strength
is the most important thing,” to an “other-regarding ethic of
love.” 172 One consequence was the concept of “human rights, the
idea of every human being[’s] [having] equal dignity and worth.” 173
This changed perspective was exemplified by Gregory the Bishop
of Nyssa, “the first person we know of, ever, that
protested . . . [that] slavery is wrong per se . . . because human
beings . . . are of infinite worth” as bearing the image of God. 174
167. I’m embarrassed to admit how difficult I find acquiescing in their having
the last word in this conversation.
168. Keller, supra note 123.
169. Id. (quoting Matthew 5:13).
170. Id. “Salt is only helpful to . . . meat if it’s not like the meat, if it’s itself.”
Id. Likewise, to function as salt for society, Christians must “remain ‘salt,’ which
is different from the rest of the culture.” Id. If British society wants the greatest
benefit from Christians, it shouldn’t “demand that they become like everybody
else. Our modern society says: we believe in respect for difference. Ok, respect
Christians’ difference.” Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. Keller says it doesn’t matter whether one is personally a Christian or
even believes in God. Id. “[Y]ou have been shaped by Christianity. Your moral
sense is not the moral sense of an eastern or ancient ‘shame and honour’ culture,
in which strength is the most important thing. You have an other-regarding, an
ethic of love, and that came from Christianity.” Id.
173. Id. For more on Christianity’s critical role in the development and
preservation of liberal democracy, see supra note 57.
174. Keller, supra note 123.
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Martin Luther King emphasized this very point—that mankind’s
“uniqueness . . . worth . . . [and] dignity” are premised in bearing
God’s image. 175 Christianity also, in “the first sexual revolution,”
transformed sexual ethics from a shame and honor approach to one
that was “consensual and covenantal.” 176
To Keller, these past examples demonstrate that Christianity
has “massively [been ‘salt’ regarding] the ideals that we all take
for granted.” 177 But what about now? Keller, in the New York
Times, cautions Christians who would
transcend politics and simply “preach the Gospel.” Those who
avoid all political discussions and engagement are essentially
casting a vote for the status quo. American churches in the early
19th century that did not speak out against slavery because that
was what we would now call “getting political” were actually
supporting slavery . . . . Christians should be involved
politically as a way of loving our neighbors, whether they
believe as we do or not. To work for better public schools or for
a justice system not weighted against the poor or to end racial
segregation requires political engagement. Christians have
done these things in the past and should continue to do so. 178
175. Keller was referring to King’s sermon, “The American Dream,” which
Keller said captured “perfectly” the requisite societal impact of recognizing
mankind as God’s image-bearers. Id; see also Calhoun, supra note 1, at 478 n.119.
In his sermon, King emphasized that there were “no gradations in the image of
God. Every man . . . is significant . . . precisely because every man is made in the
image of God . . . . This is why we must fight segregation with all of our nonviolent
might . . . .” Martin Luther King, Jr., The American Dream, STAN. U.: THE MARTIN
LUTHER
KING,
JR.,
RES.
&
EDUC.
INST.
(July
4,
1965),
https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/americandreamsermon-delivered-ebenezer-baptist-church (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Although segregation is
“inconvenient,” “sociologically untenable,” and “politically and economically
unsound,” none of these are “what makes it wrong.” Id. “Ultimately, segregation
is morally wrong and sinful.” Id.
176. Keller, supra note 123. In a shame and honor culture, sexual mores
depended upon “the social order, the hierarchy . . . . So, if you were a man of high
social status and you were married, you could have sex with who[m]ever you
wanted. Your wife couldn’t. And no woman of lower social status would ever deny
sex demanded by any man of a higher social status . . . .” Id.
177. Id. See supra note 57.
178. Timothy Keller, How Do Christians Fit Into the Two-Party System? They
Don’t, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/29/
opinion/sunday/christians-politics-belief.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). In his Parliamentary Prayer Breakfast Address,
Keller says that Christians’ future role as salt “might be more of a way of
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The church should “speak on social, economic and political
realities . . . . Racism is a sin, violating the second of the two great
commandments of Jesus, ‘to love your neighbor.’ The biblical
commands to lift up the poor and to defend the rights of the
oppressed are moral imperatives for believers.” 179 Speaking “out
against egregious violations of these moral requirements is not
optional.” 180
Some might observe that Keller doesn’t explicitly address the
rhetoric Christians should use when addressing moral wrongs.
preventing decay, it might be more of a preservative.” Keller, supra note 123.
Christians believe “we’re saved through . . . Jesus Christ . . . . He gave up his glory
and became a human being, he gave up his life and he went to the cross and died
on the cross, as he was dying, saying: father, forgive them.” Id. “[O]ur society, which
is producing self-actuali[z]ers, self-asserters . . . need[s] millions of people who’ve
been shaped by the self-giving of Jesus Christ, who say: I’m a Christian because of
Jesus’ self-giving and we’re able to say therefore I live for God and for my
neighbour . . . .” Id.
179. Keller, How Do Christians Fit?, supra note 178. If racism is sinful because
it violates the biblical concept of love, one might question the efficacy of law to
promote genuine godliness. I once did so. Calhoun, supra note 2, at 305. Now,
however, I find Martin Luther King convincing on this point:
Now the other myth that is disseminated is the idea that
legislation . . . cannot really solve the problem of racial injustice, only
education and religion can do that. Now certainly a half-truth is involved
here: if the problem is to be solved ultimately, hearts must be changed
and religion and education must play a great role . . . . But it is merely a
half-truth, for it may be true that morality cannot be legislated, but
behavior can be regulated. It may be true that the law cannot change the
heart but it can restrain the heartless. It may be true that the law cannot
make a man love me but it can keep him from lynching me . . . . In other
words, through legislation we control the external effects of bad internal
attitudes; and so it is necessary in society to have legislation . . . .
Martin Luther King, Jr., The American Dream: A Speech Given by the Rev. Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. at Drew University (Feb. 5, 1964),
https://depts.drew.edu/lib/archives/online_exhibits/king/speech/theamericandream
.pdf.
180. Keller, How Do Christians Fit?, supra note 178. Keller cautions Christians
not to label any political party “as the only Christian one.” Id. One reason is “that
most political positions are not matters of biblical command but of practical
wisdom.” Id. For example, although Christians are commanded to help the poor,
there are “many possible ways” to do so. Id. “The Bible does not give exact answers
to [such] questions for every time, place and culture.” Id. Another reason not to label
any single political party as Christian is that today “parties insist that you cannot
work on one issue with them if you don’t embrace all of their approved positions.”
Id. This package-deal approach “puts pressure on Christians in
politics . . . [because] [t]he historical Christian positions on social issues do not fit
into contemporary political alignments.” Id. See also Keller, supra note 35.
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True, but Keller does quote Scripture to identify moral violations
that Christians must combat through “political engagement.” 181 He
therefore obviously doesn’t view using overt Christian arguments as
incompatible with the Gospel. 182
I’m glad to join Keller, unconstrained by erroneous
interpretations of separation of church and state, in proclaiming the
appropriateness of Christians’ using openly Christian arguments in
fulfilling their duty to take a stand on the moral issues of our day. 183
And Keller is also right to recognize that Christians’ doing so is
entirely compatible with fidelity to the glorious Gospel of Jesus
Christ. 184
181. Keller, How Do Christians Fit?, supra note 178. See supra notes 179–180
and accompanying text.
182. At the end of his New York Times piece, Keller in fact shares the Gospel.
He doesn’t, however, present doing so as a prerequisite for all Christians who use
explicitly religious arguments in a political context. Instead, Keller uses the Gospel
to offer comfort to Christians who may “experience exclusion and persecution” for
our political participation. Id. It’s the “Gospel [that] gives us the resources to love
people who reject both our beliefs and us personally. Christians should think of how
God rescued them. He did it not by taking power but by coming to earth, losing glory
and power, serving and dying on a cross.” Id. Support for concluding that Keller
doesn’t consider explicit Gospel-sharing a mandatory component of all Christian
political engagement is found in his praise for Martin Luther King, who urged
political action to combat “sinful” segregation. See supra note 175 and
accompanying text. In condemning segregation via this pejorative religious
classification, King neither shared the Gospel himself nor urged his followers to do
so when they opposed the practice. King, American Dream, supra note 175. The
same two points are true regarding King’s earlier address, with the same name and
similar content, to a secular audience. King, supra note 179. And the same can be
said about the King publication probably reprinted more than any other. See Martin
Luther King, Jr., Letter From A Birmingham Jail, in I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS
AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 84, 100 (James Melvin Washington ed.,
1992) (referring several times to Jesus, the crucifixion, and the Gospel, but never
speaking of the Christian belief that salvation requires one’s trusting that Jesus’s
death on the Cross paid the penalty for one’s sins).
183. It’s not my position that Christians must rely exclusively upon overtly
Christian arguments. Calhoun, supra note 1, at 484 n.150. To the contrary,
prudence might dictate exclusively secular arguments in some circumstances,
although I have misgivings about this approach. Id.; see also id. at 463 n.11.
184. Keller and King both demonstrate their view that there’s no requirement
explicitly to share the Gospel on such occasions. See supra note 182. Keller’s New
York Times example, however, also offers encouragement to Christians to share the
Gospel whenever the overall situation makes it appropriate to do so. Id. For two
other occasions when Keller included a Gospel presentation when speaking about
Christians’ political responsibilities, see Keller, supra note 35; Keller, supra note
123.

